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# The Paused Continental Defence Bargain: Architecture, Asymmetry and the 2026 CUSMA Joint Review

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In May 2026, the United States Department of War paused American participation in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), the senior advisory body for continental defence cooperation that Franklin D. Roosevelt and William Lyon Mackenzie King created at Ogdensburg, NY, in August 1940. The Pentagon framed the decision as a response to Canadian non-performance on spending commitments and linked it to the prime minister's January address at Davos, Switzerland. Most Canadian commentary has read the move as either symbolic or punitive. This paper advances a third reading: that the pause is the defence-side expression of an integrated US strategy that treats trade, technology and continental security as a single negotiating surface rather than as separate policy domains, a dimension of the bilateral defence relationship that earlier accounts have not adequately weighed. It situates the pause within the 86-year institutional architecture that Ogdensburg inaugurated, traces that architecture through Hyde Park, the 1950 Statement of Principles, the Defence Production Sharing Agreement, NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), and the National Technology and Industrial Base, and argues that the venue was selected precisely because it is the only piece of the bargain that can be moved without statutory or treaty change. The paper assesses the pause against the doctrinal framework of John Holmes and the structural analysis of Robert Bothwell, and identifies five institutional measures that Canada should put in place before the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) joint review commences on July 1, 2026. The pause is reversible, but only on terms Canada itself must propose.

## INTRODUCTION: A FORUM FOLDED, A WINDOW OPENING

On May 18, 2026, six weeks before the CUSMA joint review opens in Ottawa,<sup>1</sup> the United States Department of War paused American participation in the PJBD. The announcement, made by Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby in a series of posts on the social media platform X, asserted that Canada had failed to make “credible progress” on its defence commitments and that the Pentagon would reassess how the forum benefits shared North American defence.<sup>2</sup> The thread linked directly to the transcript of Prime Minister Mark Carney’s January 2026 address at the World Economic Forum.<sup>3</sup>

The pause is the first formal interruption of the PJBD since President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King established it at Ogdensburg, New York on August 17, 1940.<sup>4</sup> For 86 years, through the Cold War, the renegotiation of the Auto Pact, the cancellation of the Avro Arrow, the construction of the Distant Early Warning Line, the Mulroney-Reagan Quebec Summit, the inclusion of Canada in the United States National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB), and the 2021 launch of the multi-year NORAD modernization program, the PJBD met at the level of senior military and civilian officials.<sup>5</sup> It has been the convening venue at which the architecture of continental defence cooperation has been politically managed.

Canadian commentary on the pause has organized around two readings. The first, advanced by Prime Minister Carney in Quebec on May 19, treats the move as symbolic. The PJBD has not met since its 242nd session in November 2024; operational cooperation continues through NORAD, the Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA), and the NTIB; and Canada has, in the past 15 months, made the largest defence investments in decades.<sup>6</sup> The second, articulated by Andrew Coyne in *The Globe and Mail*, reads the move as constraint. The pause is not about Canadian spending levels but about Canadian procurement direction; it is “part of a larger effort to contain this country within United States defined limits” across trade, defence and resources.<sup>7</sup>

American institutionalist analysis, emerging within 48 hours of the pause, deepens the constraint reading. Christopher Sands, Director of the Hopkins Center for Canadian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, wrote on May 19 that the pause departs from the logic Roosevelt and Eisenhower understood: Canadian geography materially strengthens American security, and cooperation has always been a shared strategic enterprise grounded in mutual benefit, not a privilege Washington can withhold. Sands reads Carney’s Davos address as an acknowledgment of over-dependence on the United States rather than defiance of it; the Canadian response, he argues, is “not defiance, but rearmament.” He characterizes the pause as reflecting “the sometimes-undisciplined nature of policymaking within the Trump administration,” noting that it “appears less like a settled presidential decision and more like an escalation by officials seeking to signal toughness toward Canada,” and concludes that the pause “could eventually be softened or quietly reversed” given Trump’s centralization of decisions around the president personally.<sup>8</sup>

This paper advances a third reading. The pause is best understood as the defence-side expression of an integrated US strategy, one that no longer separates trade, technology and continental security into distinct policy domains but treats them as a single negotiating surface. With this reading, the pause is directed at the architecture of continental defence cooperation as a whole, not at any individual element of Canadian conduct. The venue was chosen because it is the only institutional component of the 86-year bargain that can be moved without statutory or treaty change. The timing was chosen because the CUSMA joint review opens six weeks later, and the trade negotiation is the room in which the underlying bargain will be re-priced, meaning the terms on which each country values the other's contribution to the shared defence-industrial bargain are themselves renegotiated. The Canadian response must, accordingly, be institutional. It must neither overplay the pause as rupture nor underplay it as symbolism. The window before the joint review opens is the period in which Canada can set the terms of the re-pricing on its own selected ground.

## THE ARCHITECTURE THE FORUM ANCHORED

The PJBD has been the political summit of a five-rung institutional ladder that defined the post-1940 Canada-United States defence and industrial relationship. Each rung is documented in the historical and legal literature, and each remains operative.

The first rung is Ogdensburg. The agreement created no treaty obligations, contained no termination clause and was, in the famous account, drafted at Roosevelt's summer encampment without consultation with either cabinet.<sup>9</sup> The PJBD was its institutional product. The body was constituted at the level of senior officials, with the explicit charge to consider, in the broad sense, the defence of the north half of the Western Hemisphere. As Sands has more recently recalled, the Canadian official historian C. P. Stacey described what Ogdensburg created as “close association amounting to actual alliance.”<sup>10</sup>

The second rung is the Hyde Park Declaration of April 20, 1941. The Declaration provided that each country would provide the other with the defence articles it was best able to produce, and that American defence material produced in Canada would be eligible under the Lend-Lease Act.<sup>11</sup> In the J. L. Granatstein and R. D. Cuff account, which remains the authoritative reading, Hyde Park was “a common plan for the economic defence of the Western Hemisphere,” and Mackenzie King regarded it as of permanent significance.

The third rung is the 1950 Statement of Principles for Economic Cooperation, approved by President Harry S. Truman. The Statement extended the Hyde Park logic into the Cold War: coordination of military requirements, the best combined use of production resources and the removal of barriers impeding the flow of defence materials.<sup>12</sup>

The fourth rung is the legal and contractual architecture. The DPSA, implemented in 1956 and expanded after the cancellation of the Avro Arrow in February 1959, waived the Buy American Act for Canadian-produced defence articles, put Canadian firms on equal footing with US firms bidding to the US Department of Defense and designated the Canadian Commercial Corporation as the prime contracting Crown corporation for US defence procurement from Canada.<sup>13</sup> The Defense Development Sharing Program of 1963 extended the principle to research and development. The arrangement remains in force; Canada continues to be treated as part of the United States' domestic defence industrial base.

The fifth rung is the integrated continental architecture: NORAD (1958); the North American Defense Industrial Base Organization, established March 23, 1987 following the 1985 Quebec Summit; the formal inclusion of Canada in the United States NTIB by the Fiscal Year 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, currently codified at 10 U.S.C. § 4801; the August 14, 2021 Joint Statement on NORAD Modernization approved by Canadian Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin; and the CDN\$38.6 billion over 20 years Canadian funding package announced by Canadian Defence Minister Anita Anand on June 20, 2022.<sup>14</sup>

The PJBD has been the political room in which these rungs were periodically reviewed and adjusted. It has not had the authority to amend any of them. Its function has been convening: surfacing irritants, coordinating strategic guidance and keeping the political channels open. The pause does not affect any rung of the underlying architecture directly. It removes the place where the architecture has been managed. The board met only intermittently across its history and far less often than its semi-annual design contemplated; the first full study of its record since 1969 describes its use as perplexingly infrequent, even as its private civilian-and-military format made it the forum in which binational concerns could be aired frankly. That it had not convened since November 2024 is part of why this venue, rather than any operational element of the relationship, was the one selected: suspending a dormant forum imposed little practical cost while still signalling at the level of the architecture. What the pause forecloses is not an operation but an option, the standing channel through which the bargain has been managed.

## THE HOLMESIAN FRAMEWORK: FUNCTIONALISM, PARADOX AND DISCRETION

The most enduring scholarly account of Canadian foreign policy in the post-1945 period remains the work of John W. Holmes. Holmes spent 17 years in External Affairs, served as President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs from 1960 to 1973 and produced the two volumes of *The Shaping of Peace* that remain the canonical treatment of Canadian diplomacy in the 1943–1957 period.<sup>15</sup>

Two of Holmes's doctrines bear directly on the present moment. The first is functionalism: a state's claim to a seat at any international table rests on what it actually contributes, not on its formal sovereign status. The functionalist claim animated Canadian diplomacy from the Atlantic Charter through the founding

of the United Nations, and underwrote the postwar Canadian role in civil aviation, food and agriculture, and atomic energy. The doctrine is operational rather than rhetorical: a state demonstrates its functional contribution and is admitted on those terms.

The second is what Holmes called the acceptance of paradox. In *The Better Part of Valour*, his 1970 collection of essays, Holmes wrote: “Discretion in diplomacy is not incompatible with boldness of initiative in foreign policy or even with dramatic moves in international politics. The discretion is in the calculation of the issues at stake and the forces which can be mustered. Above all it lies in the recognition of contradiction and the acceptance of paradox.” Holmes went further: “A sound foreign policy must be based on an acceptance of paradox. This is true for great powers, but it is especially true for a middle power whose reach ought not to exceed its grasp.”<sup>16</sup>

Read through this frame, the events of May 18, 2026, illustrate the doctrine in two different respects. The Pentagon's announcement violates the discipline of discretion that has characterized the bilateral defence relationship since Ogdensburg. The Davos address to which the announcement is pinned violates the same discipline. The asymmetry is that the United States can afford the violation; Canada cannot. The institutional cost falls on the smaller party. What Holmes called the discipline of paradox is now the only available basis on which Canada can recover the initiative.

## WHAT WASHINGTON IS RESPONDING TO

The pause did not emerge from inattention. The Pentagon was responding to a specific Canadian institutional development. On February 17, 2026, the Carney government released Security, Sovereignty and Prosperity: Canada's Defence Industrial Strategy, which introduced what officials call the Build-Partner-Buy framework.<sup>17</sup> The framework directs procurement first to Canadian sources where domestic capacity exists or can be developed, then to allied partners where domestic capacity is limited and, only finally, to foreign purchases. It is paired with a Defence Investment Agency, created within Public Services and Procurement Canada in October 2025.

Ann Fitz-Gerald, Director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs, assessed the new strategy in *The Walrus* as “a meaningful step forward” that “resembles more of an actual strategy than many policy documents that Canada has produced in this space,” while cautioning that “turning this investment into lasting value will require more coordinated thinking.”<sup>18</sup> The endorsement and the caution define the policy challenge: the strategy is a genuine institutional advance, but its operationalization depends on coordinated capacity that the Defence Investment Agency must yet build.

The Build-Partner-Buy framework re-prices the US position within Canadian defence procurement from a preferred supplier under the Defence Production Sharing Agreement to one allied partner among several. Whether Washington reads that shift fairly is a separate question; that Washington reads it as the shift it is, is not. The Pentagon paused the PJBD because it concluded that the strategy represents the

start of a Canadian re-positioning that the existing convening venue could not contain or shape on terms acceptable to Washington.

The pause is the defence-side manifestation of a broader pattern of pressure across the trade, technology and continental security surfaces of the relationship. The first dimension was the Office of the Trade Representative's *2026 National Trade Estimate Report's* characterization of Canadian industrial policy.<sup>19</sup> The second was the US Trade Representative testimony on Section 301 and digital services taxes. The third was the PJBD pause itself. Whether these actions are centrally directed or instead reflect parallel choices by officials who share concerns about Canada without sharing a single plan, they converge: the pause is the defence-side expression of an integrated economic and security posture directed at the upcoming CUSMA joint review. The coordination claimed here is structural rather than orchestrated. What the public record establishes is the sequence and the timing; that the sequence amounts to a single design is an inference drawn from that timing and context, not a demonstrated fact. It would be a mistake, finally, to treat the American grievance as a creation of the present administration. Frustration with Canadian defence contributions has been voiced across United States administrations of both parties for decades, and it reaches well beyond the headline spending figure to procurement choices, force readiness, Arctic capability and industrial participation. Canadian discussion has tended to dismiss that frustration as rhetoric; the cost of doing so has been a steady erosion of Canada's standing as a serious partner in Washington. A published fiscal pathway answers the spending number. It does not, by itself, answer the broader political question of burden sharing.

This reading is reinforced by a striking institutional fact. In July 2025, the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies, a Department of Defense-adjacent research body, published a Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review-cleared paper by Kathryn Friedman and Greg Pollock that recommended elevating the PJBD, co-chairing it at the level of the US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and a Canadian counterpart, restoring semi-annual meetings, and focusing the agenda on Arctic security and critical minerals.<sup>20</sup> The Pentagon paused, on May 18, 2026, the institution its own research community had recommended in July 2025 be elevated. The pause is not the product of continuous US defence-policy thinking. It is a discrete political choice with a distinct political target.

## FIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES BEFORE THE JOINT REVIEW OPENS

Reading the pause as architectural rather than procedural identifies the period before the CUSMA joint review opens as the window for the Canadian institutional response. Five measures are available, independent but mutually reinforcing.

**First**, the Government of Canada should publish, before July 1, 2026, a Canadian counter-statement of principles for North American defence cooperation, functioning as the 2026 analogue to the 1950 Statement of Principles. The document would restate the Hyde Park bargain in contemporary terms,

identifying what Canada offers: Arctic geography, the most diversified critical-mineral endowment in the Group of Seven, hydroelectric and nuclear power, sovereign-cloud-eligible compute capacity, forced-labour-free supply chains and operational contributions such as the Canada-Australia Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar partnership.<sup>21</sup> It would specify what Canada expects in return: Canadian Commercial Corporation prime contracting preserved, NTIB membership reaffirmed, DPSA equal footing honoured and the PJBD restored on the cadence the Ted Stevens Center recommended.

**Second**, the Canadian government should pair forthcoming procurement decisions, particularly the F-35 review and the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project shortlist, with an explicit on-the-record statement of what share of Canadian defence procurement will remain integrated with the US NTIB under the Build-Partner-Buy framework. The United States perception that Build-Partner-Buy signals a silent exit from the integrated North American defence economy is currently performing the political work that has produced the pause. Reciprocal transparency closes that perception gap without altering Canadian policy.

**Third**, the CUSMA joint review process should be used to formally propose the expansion of the agreement's digital trade (Chapter 19) and critical minerals provisions to include a North American defence supply chain certification mechanism. The proposal would treat the security, digital and trade dimensions of the relationship as integrated, consistent with the framework set out in the submission filed by the Balsillie Legal Advisory Centre with the Office of the US Trade Representative on March 19, 2026.<sup>22</sup> The joint review thereby becomes the venue in which the defence relationship is reconstructed on terms Canada itself proposes. The trade negotiation, not a successor defence forum, becomes the institutional answer to the pause.

**Fourth**, the government should convene a Canadian standing body that integrates Global Affairs Canada, the Department of National Defence, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, the Privy Council Office and the Defence Investment Agency in a continuous defence-industrial strategy. The body would discharge the convening function the PJBD performed in the bilateral relationship. It would operationalize the sovereign advisory system the author proposed in an earlier work,<sup>23</sup> and would be structured to receive the implementation reporting that the Defence Investment Agency will generate.

**Fifth**, the government should publish, before the joint review opens, a credible fiscal pathway from current core defence spending to the 3.5 percent of GDP North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitment by 2035. The Parliamentary Budget Officer has documented a CDN\$18.5 billion cumulative shortfall between planned and actual capital spending at the Department of National Defence over the period 2017-2018 to 2023-2024 and has scored the fiscal implications of meeting NATO's five percent target.<sup>24</sup> Former Parliamentary Budget Officer Kevin Page has correctly identified the absence of a published pathway as indefensible. Publishing the pathway removes the strongest empirical claim available to those advancing the spending-shortfall reading of the pause.

The five measures are designed to work in sequence. The counter-statement of principles establishes the substantive frame. The procurement transparency statement closes the perception gap. The joint review proposal creates the negotiating venue. The Canadian convening body performs the institutional function. The fiscal pathway removes the empirical objection. Together, they constitute a response that meets the discipline of paradox Holmes identified: real and consequential, while acknowledging the structural asymmetry within which Canadian agency operates.

## **CONCLUSION: DISCRETION AND INITIATIVE IN THE PENCILLED HAND**

Ogdensburg was, in the formulation that has come down through the Canadian historical literature, drafted in pencil. Roosevelt and King met on short notice, with no treaty text and no congressional or parliamentary authorization. The institution they created held for 86 years through war, recession, industrial reorganization and four decades of nuclear-era continental defence cooperation. On May 18, 2026, a US Under Secretary of War for Policy folded the same institution from his desk, in a sequence of posts on a social media platform. The instrument that created the bargain is the instrument that paused it.

The architecture beneath the pause remains intact. NORAD operates. The Defence Production Sharing Agreement continues to channel US Department of Defense procurement through the Canadian Commercial Corporation. Canadian membership in the National Technology and Industrial Base stands. What has been lost is the convening venue at which the architecture has been politically managed. What can be recovered is the function the venue performed. Sands is correct that the pause could be softened or reversed. But reversal will not happen on its own, and it will not happen on terms Canada selects unless Canada acts before the joint review to make reversal Washington's easier path. The five measures in the section Five Institutional Measures Before the Joint Review Opens above are the conditions under which the United States can restore the PJBD without abandoning the pressure campaign that justified its pause. The choice is not Canada's alone to make. The burden of initiative falls more heavily on the smaller partner, but Washington too faces a decision about how it wishes to manage an 86-year alliance. Restoring confidence in continental defence cooperation is, in the end, a shared responsibility.

Robert Bothwell argued that Canadians repeatedly underestimated the structural asymmetry of their relationship with the United States.<sup>25</sup> Ian Drummond made the same argument from the economic side: the post-1959 Canadian defence-industrial base survived by integrating into US procurement on terms the United States set. Holmes argued that sound Canadian foreign policy must accept the paradox: Canada is real and consequential, but its reach must not exceed its grasp. The three converge on a single prescription. Canada must respond institutionally, demonstrating both the value it brings to the bargain and the discipline with which it operates within the bargain's asymmetry.

The pause is not, on the analysis offered here, primarily a defence policy event. It is the defence-side expression of an integrated US strategy directed at the CUSMA joint review. The Canadian answer

must, therefore, be integrated as well using the Defence Industrial Strategy, Defence Investment Agency, CUSMA negotiation, Canadian Commercial Corporation channel and fiscal framework. Each component is in place or within reach. What is required is the political decision to assemble them.

Holmes wrote that discretion in diplomacy is compatible with boldness of initiative. The discretion is in the calculation. The decision Canada faces is whether to allow the pause to stand as Washington framed it, or to set the terms on which the next round occurs. The first yields initiative to Washington. The second exercises Holmesian discretion. Ogdensburg was drafted in pencil. So is this. The pencil is in the Canadian hand.

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## END NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, December 13, 2019, Can.T.S. 2020 No. 5, entered into force July 1, 2020. Article 34.7 provides for a joint review by the Free Trade Commission on the sixth anniversary of entry into force. See also Office of the United States Trade Representative, "Joint Statement on the USMCA Joint Review," March 5, 2026, <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/march/joint-statement-usmca-joint-review>.

<sup>2</sup> Elbridge Colby (@USWPColby), post on X, May 18, 2026, <https://x.com/USWPColby/status/1924105420879876096>. The US Department of Defense is referenced in Trump administration communications as the Department of War. See Mike Crawley, "Pentagon Walks Away from Canada-U.S. Defence Board," CBC News, May 18, 2026, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trump-canada-us-joint-defence-board-9.7203211>.

<sup>3</sup> Mark Carney, "Special Address by the Prime Minister of Canada," World Economic Forum, Davos, January 20, 2026, <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada>. Carney told the Forum that "middle powers must act together, because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu."

<sup>4</sup> Ogdensburg Agreement, August 17, 1940. The agreement was announced as a press release rather than concluded as a treaty instrument; no Senate ratification was sought and no statutory implementing legislation was enacted in either country. See C. P. Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-1945," *International Journal* 9, no. 2 (Spring 1954): 107-24; P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "Permanency, Reassurance, and Quiet Diplomacy: The PJBD at Eighty," North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN) Policy Primer, August 2020. On the PJBD's record of activity and its perplexingly infrequent use, see Nicholas Glesby, "The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD): An Examination of Its Advice Outcomes Legacy, 1940-2023" (MA thesis, University of Manitoba, 2023), <http://hdl.handle.net/1993/37562>.

<sup>5</sup> Department of National Defence, "The 242nd Meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense," Readout, November 14, 2024, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2024/11/the-242nd-meeting-of-the-permanent-joint-board-on-defence.html>; Robert Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984* (UBC Press, 2007), 28-32.

<sup>6</sup> Kyle Duggan, "Carney Downplays Washington's Decision to Pause Bilateral Defence Board," Canadian Press, May 19, 2026, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/carney-canada-us-defence-board-9.7204732>; Office of the Prime Minister, "Prime Minister Carney Announces Canada Has Achieved the NATO 2% Defence Spending Target," March 26, 2026, <https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2026/03/26/prime-minister-carney-announces-canada-has-achieved-nato-2-defence>.

<sup>7</sup> Andrew Coyne, "With Its Pause on the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the U.S. Is Attempting to Constrain Canada," *The Globe and Mail*, May 19, 2026, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-permanent-joint-board-on-defence-us-attempting-to-constrain-canada>.

<sup>8</sup> Christopher Sands, "Giving Offense, Getting the Best Defense?," *US Canada Observer*, May 19, 2026, <https://christophersands1.substack.com/p/giving-offense-getting-the-best-defense>. Sands cites C. P. Stacey's description of Ogdensburg as creating "close association amounting to actual alliance."

<sup>9</sup> J. L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or for Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Copp Clark Pitman, 1991).

<sup>10</sup> Sands, "Giving Offense," citing Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board."

<sup>11</sup> J. L. Granatstein and R. D. Cuff, "The Hyde Park Declaration 1941: Origins and Significance," *Canadian Historical Review* 55, no. 1 (1974): 59-80.

<sup>12</sup> Statement of Principles for Economic Cooperation, October 26, 1950, reprinted in US Department of State Bulletin, November 6, 1950, 743–44. See also Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion*, 60–63.

<sup>13</sup> Canadian Commercial Corporation, “U.S.–Canada Defense Procurement Cooperation Agreements,” Factsheet, 2025, <https://www.ccc.ca/en/about/history-of-canada-u-s-industrial-cooperation-agreements>; James G. Fergusson, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1954–2009: Déjà Vu All Over Again* (UBC Press, 2010). On the operative legal framework, see Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 225.870, particularly 225.870-1 and 225.870-4(a); Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 4552(7) (defining “domestic source” to include Canadian-based business concerns).

<sup>14</sup> Andrea Charron and James Fergusson, *NORAD: In Perpetuity and Beyond* (McGill–Queen's University Press, 2022); 10 U.S.C. § 4801 (NTIB definition, as originally enacted by Pub. L. 102-484 (FY93 NDAA), expanded to include the United Kingdom and Australia by Pub. L. 114-328 (FY17 NDAA), and further expanded to include New Zealand by Pub. L. 117-263 (FY23 NDAA)); Government of Canada and Government of the United States, “Joint Statement on NORAD Modernization,” August 14, 2021, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2021/08/joint-statement-on-norad-modernization.html>; Government of Canada, “Minister Anand Announces Continental Defence Modernization to Protect Canadians,” June 20, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/06/minister-anand-announces-continental-defence-modernization-to-protect-canadians.html>.

<sup>15</sup> John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943–1957*, 2 vols. (University of Toronto Press, 1979 and 1982); John W. Holmes, *Life with Uncle: The Canadian–American Relationship* (University of Toronto Press, 1981); Adam Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations* (UBC Press, 2005).

<sup>16</sup> John W. Holmes, *The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy* (McClelland and Stewart, Carleton Library Series, 1970), viii. Kim Richard Nossal subsequently used the phrase as the title of his 1982 edited collection in Holmes's honour: Kim Richard Nossal, ed., *An Acceptance of Paradox: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy in Honour of John W. Holmes* (Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982).

<sup>17</sup> Government of Canada, “Security, Sovereignty and Prosperity: Canada's Defence Industrial Strategy,” Department of National Defence, February 17, 2026, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/industrial-strategy/security-sovereignty-prosperity.html>.

<sup>18</sup> Ann Fitz-Gerald, quoted in “Canada's New Defence Strategy Is Bold and Unprecedented. Will It Work?,” *The Walrus*, February 18, 2026, <https://thewalrus.ca/defence-industrial-strategy-experts>.

<sup>19</sup> Office of the United States Trade Representative, *2026 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers*, Office of the United States Trade Representative, March 31, 2026, [https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2026\\_National\\_Trade\\_Estimate\\_Report.pdf](https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2026_National_Trade_Estimate_Report.pdf).

<sup>20</sup> Kathryn Friedman and Greg Pollock, *U.S.–Canadian Security Cooperation Is Critical to Achieving a Stable Arctic*, Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies, July 15, 2025, DOPSR cleared 25-P-1000, <https://tedstevensarcticcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Cleared-US-Canada-Cooperation-17-Jul-25.pdf>.

<sup>21</sup> On the Canada–Australia Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar partnership and other recent Canadian commitments referenced by the Minister of National Defence in response to the PJBD pause, see Steven Chase and Adrian Morrow, “Carney Plays Down Trump Administration's Suspension of Joint Canada–U.S. Defence Board,” *The Globe and Mail*, May 19, 2026, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-carney-trump-defence-board-pjbd-suspension>.

<sup>22</sup> Barry Appleton, Ann Fitz-Gerald and James W. Hinton, “Allied by Design, Vulnerable by Default: Why a Durable Plurilateral Critical Minerals Agreement Must Address Security, Digital Sovereignty, and Institutional Reliability,” Submission to USTR Docket No. USTR-2026-0034, March 19, 2026; Federal Register, “Request for Comments on the Design of a Plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Critical Minerals,” 91 Fed. Reg. 9686, February 26, 2026, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/26/2026-03912/request-for-comments-on-the-design-of-a-plurilateral-agreement-on-trade-in-critical-minerals>.

<sup>23</sup> Barry Appleton, “A Sovereign Advisory System for Canada: Rebuilding Strategic Foresight in Trade and Innovation,” Centre for International Governance Innovation, October 7, 2025, <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/a-sovereign-advisory-system-for-canada-rebuilding-strategic-foresight-in-trade-and-innovation>.

<sup>24</sup> Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, “Planned Capital Spending under Canada’s Defence Policy: 2025 Update,” RP-2526-016-S, October 29, 2025, <https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/publications/RP-2526-016-S--planned-capital-spending-under-canada-defence-policy-2025-update>; Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, “Fiscal Implications of Meeting NATO’s 5% Commitment,” RP-2526-022-S, February 5, 2026, <https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/publications/RP-2526-022-S--fiscal-implications-meeting-nato-5-commitment>.

<sup>25</sup> Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion. See also Robert Bothwell, *Your Country, My Country: A Unified History of the United States and Canada* (Oxford University Press, 2015), chap. 12; Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, *Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism*, rev. ed. (University of Toronto Press, 1989).



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